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1. Introduction. 
Definitions of "subjective" or "personal" probability, such as .. that 
of Savage, involve hypothetical preferences or choices of a subject which 
carry information about subjective probability values. For example, 
Savage (1954, p. 28) says: 
We therefore address him thus: "We see you are about to 
open those eggs. If you will be so cooperative as to guess 
that one or the other egg is good, we will pay you a dollar, 
should your guess prove correct. If incorrect you and we 
are quits, except that we will in any event exchange your 
two eggs for two of guaranteed goodness." If under these 
circumstances the person stakes his chances on the brown 
egg, it seems to me to correspond well with ordinary usage 
to say that it is more probable to him that the brown one 
is good than that the white one is. 
By replacing the breaking of one egg (outcomes "good" or "bad") with 
the toss of a fair coin (outcomes "heads" or "tails") we may determine 
whether the subjective probability of the remaining egg being good is 
> 1/2 or < 1/2. If further choices are then offered, the subjective 
probability presumably can be restricted to narrower limits. We find 
however that certain difficulties arise in the choice of stake at 
each stage of the procedure. In short, an apparently dishonest choice 
may in some cases be advantageous to the subject. The present paper is 
concerned with the characterization of procedures which "encourage 
honesty." 
The problems have counterparts in previously studied methods of 
"payoff functions" for evaluating the performance of proba.bility appraisers. 
Such payoff functions were first suggested by Good (1952), and have since 
been studied for example by McCarthy (1956), deFinetti (1962) and Winkler 
(1967). In these studies, the appraiser is offered a prize (or possibly 
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is penalized) by a reward depending on his estimated or appraised value, 
say p, and on the actual outcome of the event whose probability is 
appraised. Such payoffs are said to "encourage honesty" if the expected 
payoff calculated from any hypothetical true value of pis maximized 
when p = p. McCarthy (1956) characterizes payoff functions having this 
property. 
In the present paper sequential procedures are studied in which, for 
simplicity, each choice divides in half the range of possible values of 
the probability. These procedures are described in Section 2. Section 3 
gives expressions for the accumulated expected payoff. In Section 4 we 
define payoffs which "encourage honesty" to be those having the property 
that the honest choice by the subject at each stage gives the largest 
accumulated expected payoff when the true probability is known. Sections 5 
and 6 establish some properties of expected payoffs, including characterizations 
of payoffs which encourage honesty for finite sequential procedures. The 
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infinite case is discussed briefly in Section 7. 1..1 
2. Description of the procedure. 
/ 
Let A denote an event having unknown probability p and let B 
r 
denote an event with known probabilities r. (We assume such exist 
for r = 1/2, 1/4, 3/4, 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, etc. Of course the existence of 
a single fair coin which can be tossed repeatedly implies this.) The 
appraiser is offered a sequence of choices of prospects. At any step 
Prospect A is a payoff of g{r) if A occurs and Prospect B is a 
payoff of g(r) if B occurs. It remains to describe the sequence 
r 
{r) of r-values and to choose g{r). This is to be done in such a way n 
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that the best choices for the appraiser when p is actually known will 
allow us to deduce the value of p from his choices. 
Consider the following particular choice. At Step 1, r = r 1 = 1/2. 
At Step 2, r = r 2 = 1/4 or 3/4 according as Prospect B or A was chosen 
at Step 1. Similarly at Step n, r = r will be either 
n 
-n 
r 1- 2 or n-
-n 
r 1+ 2 according as the preceding choice was B or A. Clearly the n-
idea here is to obtain a sequence of r values converging to the true 
p when it is known, or to the appraised value ,. p in any case. The 
appraiser will presumably attempt to maximize his expected payoff which 
he will calculate using ,. p rather than p when the latter is unknown. 
Of course at Step 1 he then chooses A if p > 1/2 provided he only 
considers the payoff determined by this first choice. If however the 
rules for the subsequent steps are known to him, the "dishonest" choice 
of B when p > 1/2 could actually increase his expectation at later 
stages. For this reason the choice of values g(r) is relevant to an 
honest appraisal. 
3. Expressions for expected payoff functions. 
Let a.= -1 
J 
if A is chosen. 
if Prospect B is chosen at the jth step and 
Then r can be expressed by 
n 
(3.1) 1 n~ -j-1 rn = 2 + LJ 2 aj, n = 2, 3, ••• , j=l 
and r 1 = 1/2. 
a. = +l 
J 
There are slightly troublesome difficulties which arise when the 
appraiser is indifferent between the two prospects. For example, if 
p = 1/2 he is indifferent between A and B. However in the case 
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when n - co we can still obtain rn - 1/2 whether r 2 = 1/4 or 3/4. 
It would be desirable here to choose the values g(r) so that the expected 
payoff does not depend on which choice is made in any case where the 
appraiser is indifferent. The extent to which this can be accomplished 
will be considered below. 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
It is convenient to define 
C • (xjx = 2-1\, k = 1, 3, •••. , 2n-l} 
n 
D = 
n 
n 
U C. 
j=l J 
D = D • 
00 
Then our payoff function g(r) is to be defined for all re D (although 
we will also consider finite procedures requiring only re D ). 
n 
At Step n the payoff is either g(r) with probability r if 
n n 
B is chosen (a = -1) or g(r) with probability p if A is chosen 
n n 
{a = +1). Thus the increment in the expected payoff is r g{r) if 
n n n 
a = -1 or pg(r) if a = +l. The cumulative expected payoff at the 
n n n 
nth step depends on p and on the partial sequence of choices 
(3.5) 
and can be expressed as 
(3.6) 
where 
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(3.7) 
(3.8) I 
F (G) = 
n n 6 rkg(rk) l~k~n 
~=+l 
G (a ) = ~ g(rk). 
n n k~~n 
8k=+l 
Now let r be any value 0 < r < 1 and r, D. 
n 
Then r determines 
a unique binary expansion up to the nth term, and so we may replace (3.5) by 
(3.9) H (r, p) = F {r) + pG (r) n n n 
unders ta:i ding that r determines a unique a • From (3.9) we 
n 
the cumulated expected payoff H (r, p) is linear in p and 
n 
function in r whose discontinuities occur at the points of 
at multiples of -n at exactly those points of 2 ' or we may say 
where H (•, p) is not defined. 
n 
see that 
a step 
D, that 
n 
(o, 1) 
It is straightforward to calculate the jump in H (•, p) at each 
n 
discontinuity. Consider first Case 1: r = k/2n where k is odd 
(that is 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
r e C ) • We find 
n 
F (r-) - F {r+) = rg(r) 
n n 
G (r+) - G (r-) = g(r). 
n n 
is 
For Case 2, we express any other point r of discontinuity 
-s 
(re D 1= D - C) n- n n 
uniquely in the form r = 2 k where k is odd and s < n. For these 
we find 
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(3.12) 
n-s 
F (r-) - F (r+) = rg(r) - ~ {r + 2-s-j)g(r + 2-s-j) 
n n j=l 
G (r+) - G {r-) = g(r) 
n n 
n-s ~ ( -s-j) LJ gr-2 • 
j=l 
4. Payoffs which encourage honesty. 
We assume that the appraiser knows the rules by which the payoffs 
. are to be made, including the payoff values g(r). The range of values 
of H (r, p) (where O < p < 1 is fixed and re [O, 1] - D) is the 
n n 
set of all possible expected payoffs for the appraiser at time n. From 
(3.6) through (3.9) the appraiser can calculate his expected payoff 
from the value of r which determines the sequence 
presumed value of p. 
A payoff function would encourage honesty if 
(4.1) H (p, p) > H (r, p) 
n n 
for all r + p. 
a and from a 
n 
But since H (r, p) is a step function in r we cannot actually achieve 
n 
inequality for all r + p. If p + 2-~ (k odd), let Ikn be the 
interval (2-~, 2-n(k+l)) (k odd) which contains p. We require 
(4.2) H (p, p) > H {r, p) 
n n all r ~ Ikn' 
(for all p + 2-~). Any payoff g(r) such that (4.2) is satisfied will 
be said to "encourage honesty" at the nth stage. For p values on the 
boundary points 2-~ no additional requirement is needed since (4.2) 
is strong enough to imply appropriate behavior. More specifically, it 
can be shown that when p = 2-~ 
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(4.3) H (p+, p) = H (p-, p) > H (r, p) 
n n - n 
all re [O, l] - D. 
n 
The proof uses (4.2) and continuity of H (r, p) as a function of p. 
n 
Hence if (4.2) holds and p e D then the appraiser's maximum expected 
n 
payoff is H (p+, p) = H (p-, p). For simplicity, extend the domain of 
n n 
definition of H (r, p), F (r), and G {r) to re [O, 1] by right-
n n n 
continuity. Then (4.2) is ~quivalent to 
(4.4) H (p, p) > H (r, p) 
n - n 
with equality only when both p and r belong to the same interval 
(2-1\, 2-n(k+l)) or when p = 2-1\ and re (2-n{k-1), 2-n(k+l)). 
5. Properties of expected payoffs. 
We first consider properties of H defined by (3.9) which hold 
n 
for rather arbitrary F and G. 
n n 
Theorem 1. Let F(•) and G(•) be defined on (o, l); let 
(5.1) H{r, p) = F(r) + pG(r) 
for r, p e (0, 1) and let 
(5.2) H(p, p) ~ H(r, p) all r, p e (o, 1). 
Then (i) F is nonincreasing and G is nondecreasing. (ii) For fixed 
p, H(r, p) is nonincreasing for r > p and nondecreasing for r < p. 
(iii) H(p, p) is continuous • 
Proof. (i) Using (5.2) twice we have 
F(p) + G(p)p ~ F(r) + G(r)p = F(r) + G(r)r - G(r)(r-p) 
~ F(p) + G(p)r - G(r)(r-p) = F(p) + G(p)p + G(p)(r-p) 
- G(r)(r-p). 
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Thus (G(p) - G(r))(r-p) ~ O, which implies G is nondecreasing. Assuming 
p < r, using (5.2) again, and G(p) :S G(r} 
F(p) + pG(p) 2:: F(r) + pG(r) 
2: F(r) + pG(p) 
completing the proof of (i). (ii) If p ~ r ~ s, by (5.2) and (i), 
F(r) + pG(r) = F(r) + rG(r) + (p-r)G(r) _2:: F(s) + rG(s) + (p-r)G(s) 
= F ( s) + pG( s) • 
If p ~ s ~ r 
F(r) + pG(r) = F(r) + sG(r) + (p-s}G(r) ~ F(s) + sG(s) + (p-s)G(s) 
= F(s) + pG(s) 
which proves (ii). {iii) Let {y} be either an increasing or a 
n 
decreasing sequence with limy m P• n Then both lim F(y) and lim G(y) n n 
exist, and using (16) twice 
F(p) + pH(p) 2: lim (F(yn) + pG(yn)} 
= lim {F(y) + y G(y )} 
n n n 
?: lim {F(p) + ynG(p)} 
= F(p) + pG(p) qed. 
Theorem 2. Let F(•) and G(•) be defined on (0, 1) and let H 
be defined by (5.1). Then (5.2) holds if and only if G is nondecreasing 
and 
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(5.3) F(r) = s z dG(z) + C 
r 
for some constant c • 
Proofe Assume (5.3) and G nondecreasing. Then 
s J {z-r)dG(z) ~ O if s > r 
r 
H(r, r) - H(s, r) = 
r J (r-z)dG{z) ~ 0 if s < r 
s 
so that (5.2) holds. Now assume (5.2). Then G is nondecreasing by 
Theorem 1. Let h(r) be defined by 
1 
· (5 .4) F{r) = h(r) + J zdG{z). 
r 
Then (5.2) implies 
(5.5) F{r) - F{s) ~ r{G{s) - G(r)}, 
from which we get 
r (5.6) h{r) - h(s) ~ f (z-r)dG(z) 
s 
r s 
where J means - f when r < s • 
s r 
decreasing or increasing sequence 
For any e >-0 we can find a 
n {xk}k=l with x1 = s, xn = r and 
(5.7) r n-1 xk+l If zdG{z) - ~ xk J dG(z) I < e. 
s k=l xk 
Then using (5.6) on each term 
- 9 -
n-1 
(5.8) h(r) - h{s) = ~ (h{xk+l) - h(~)) 
k=l 
n-1 X ~ ~ r k+l (z x )dG(z) L-1 J - k 
k=l xk 
> - e. 
Hence h(r) - h(s) ~ o. But since r and s are arbitrary we must have 
h(s) - h(r) 2:: O. Therefore h(•) is constant. qed. 
Corollary 1. If F and G are right-continuous step functions, 
then necessary and sufficient conditions for (5.2) are: {i) G is non-
decreasing; {ii) H{p, p) is continuous for all p. 
00 
Proof. Let {rk)k=l be the points where either F or. G is 
discontinuous. Then a necessary and sufficient condition for (5.3) is 
(5.9) all k, 
and this is equivalent to {ii). 
Corollary 2. If (5.2) holds and H(p, p) = H(r, p) for some 
r, p € (0, l] then F(p) = F{r) and G(p) = G(r). 
Proof. If H{p, p) = H{r, p) then 
(5.10) F(p) - F(r) = p[G(r) - G(p)]. 
If (5.2) holds, then by Theorem 1, G is nondecreasing and by (5.10), 
r r f zdG(z} = J pdG{z), or 
p p 
r f {z-p)dG(z) = O. 
p 
- 10 -
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But the above integral is positive unless G{r) = G(p), in which case 
F(r) = F(p). 
6. Properties of payoffs which encourage honesty. 
We now apply the preceding results to determine properties of the 
payoffs g(r) which will encourage honesty. 
Lemma lo Let F, G, H be defined by (3.9) through (3.13). 
n n n 
Hn(p, p) is continuous if and only if 
n-s . . n-s 
Then 
(6.1) 'E {r + 2-s-J)g(r + 2-s-J) = r ~ g(r - 2-s-j) 
j=l j=l 
for all re C 
s 
and for all s = 1, 2, ••• , n-1. 
Proofo For re C, H (p, p) is continuous by (3.10), (3.11). For 
n n 
re D = D - C continuity of Hn(p, p) is equivalent to (5.9) (with 
n-1 n n 
subscripts n added) and-(3.12) and (3.13) give (6.1). 
Theorem 3o Let F, G, H be defined by (3.9) through (3.13) and 
n n n 
the assumption of right-continuity. Then necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for (4.2) are (6.1) and 
(6.2) 
n-s . 
g(r) > 'E g(r - 2-s-J) 
j=l 
for s = 1, 2, ••• , n-1. 
all re C, 
s 
Proof. We can use the theory of Section 5 with su~script n added 
to F, G, and H. Using Corollary 2 it is easy to see that (4.2) is 
equivalent to (5.2) with the additional condition that G (p+) + G (p-) 
n n 
for p e D. Hence by Corollaries 1 and 2 we have (4.2) holdsif and 
n 
only if the following three conditions hold: 
- 11 -
(i) G is nondecreasing 
n 
(ii) Hn(p, p) is continuous 
(iii) Gn(p+) f Gn(p-) for p e Dn. 
By Lemma 1, condition {ii) is equivalent to (6.1). Since Gn is a step 
function with jumps given by (3.13), we have conditions (i) and (iii) 
equivalent to (6.2). 
Theorem 4. Let F, G, H be defined by (3.9) through (3.13) 
n n n 
for n = 1, 2, •••• Then necessary and sufficient conditions for (4.2) 
.. _ 
.... 
m ._. 
to hold for all positive integers n are that for every k = 3, 5, ••• , 2 -1, 
(6.3) m=2, 3, ••• , 
(6.4) m = 1, 2, ••• , 
where 
(6.5) 
Proof. Suppose (6.3) and (6.4) hold. For given r, s , j , define 
m k by k = 2 r + 1 where -m. -s-j m = s + j • Then 2 k = r + 2 , 
2-m(k-2) = r - 2-s-j, and (6.3) implies termwise equality of the sums in 
(6.1). To prove (6.2), for given re C define m,k by m =sand 2-1\: = r. 
s 
Then by (6.3) h(k)g(2-m) = g(r) and the corresponding terms under the 
right hand summations in (6.2) and (6.4) are equal {by (6.3)). Inequality 
in (6.2) follows from dropping terms (all positive) beyond j = n - s. 
Thus (6.1) and (6.2) hold, and by Theorem 3, these imply (4.2). Now 
suppose (4.2) holds, or equivalently (6.1) and (6.2) hold. We will prove 
(6.3) by induction on m. 
- 12 -
.... 
I 
I 
111111 
-. 
If m = 2 then (6.1) gives 
(6.6) 
which establishes (6.3) for m = 2. Now suppose (6.3) holds for 
m = 2, 3, ••• , m0-l. We will show it holds also for m = m0 • For any 
mo -mo 
k = 3, 5, ••• , 2 -1, let r = (k-1)2 • Then re Cs where s < m0 • 
By the induction hypothesis the summations of (6.1) are equal term by 
term for s + j < n, that is for all terms except the last. Hence by 
(6.1) the last terms are equal. That is, (r+2-m)g(r+2-m) = rg(r-2-m), 
or 2-°\cg(2-°\c) = 2-m(k-l)g(2-m(k-2)). This proves (6.3). The proof 
of (6.4) involves substituting terms given by (6.3). 
A simple sufficient condition can be given for the condition (6.4) 
of Theorem 4. For h defined by (6.5) we have 
(6.7) h(2jk-1) k + 1 k + 3 h(k) = k + 2 • k + 4 
Now suppose that 
(6.8) 
00 
g(2-m) > ~ g(2-m-j) 
- j=l 
••• 
m = 1, 2, •••• 
Then (6.7) and (6.8) imply (6.4). Thus (6.3) and (6.8) are sufficient 
conditions for (4.2). A further simplification is the restriction 
(6.9) ( -m-1) 1 ( -m) g2 ~2g2 m = 1, 2, ••• 
which implies (6.8). This leads us to a particular solution obtained by 
taking equality in (6.9) for each m. Arbitrarily taking g(½) = ½ we 
- 13 -
get 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 5 2 4 1 g(li) = 4 ' g(4) = 3 . 4 ' g(-g) = "S ' g(-g) = 3 . "S ' g(-g) = 3 . 5 . 'S ' 
7 2 4 6 1 1 1 
g( 'S) = 3 • 5 • 7 • '8 ' g (lb) = Io ' etc· 
7. Payoffs which encourage honesty in the limit. 
Consider the case of an infinite sequence of choices (n ~ ~). Then 
the expected payoff for rt D is 
for each n then 
lim H {r, p). If (4.2) holds 
n~ ~ n 
(7.1) H(p, p) ~ H(r, p) for all p ~ D, r f D. 
· Thus the infinite procedure almost encourages honesty, where we must 
say "almost" because of the possibility of equality in some cases when 
r + p. However it can be shown that (6.3) plus strict inequality in 
(6.4) plus existence of 
whenever r + p. 
lim Hn(r, P) implies strict inequality in (7.1) 
Presumably (7.1) could hold for infinite procedures which do not 
encourage honesty for each n. We hope to consider such cases in a 
later report. 
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